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an experienced resemblance with human expression.46 This is because he thinks 
resemblance is unable to do any systematic work at the theoretical level because, as he 
notes, depictions of expressing figures are not facsimiles of actual (that is, non­
depicted) expression. Even 'realistic' looking depictions are abstractions that have to 
accommodate the static nature of the medium (Lopes, 2005:70-71). Further, naturalistic 
depictions of expressions are not going to explain the hard cases like sad trees and 
exuberant abstract works. As we have discussed I do not turn rectangular or blue when 
sad, yet this is the look of the sad Rothko painting. Two necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions will explain pictorial expressiveness, according to Lopes; the painting must 
have (1) an expression-look, and this must (2) have the function, in the circumstances, 
of indicating E (Lopes, 2005:73). The first condition is that expressive paintings must 
instantiate expression-looks. 
But what is an 'expression-look'? 
Figure 11 Mark Rothko, Chapel Painting, 1964 
46 This echoes his rejection of a resemblance account for depiction. For more on Lopes positive account of depiction 




































































The expression in the Maus panel, is explained by the picture looking foreboding (Lopes, 
2005:65). 
Figure 12 © Art Spiegelman, Panel from Maus I 'My Father Bleeds History', 1973 
What makes it look foreboding is a combination of the swastika road fork, a symbol now 
conventionally associated with evil and destruction, the leafless knobbly trees on the 
roadside, the actual historical facts about the mass crematoriums represented by the 
distant industrial building with active chimneys and the trusting sweet mice-characters 
innocently holding hands on their way toward it. But none of these features need to be 
theoretically privileged, "[w]hat the scene depicted in the panel from Maus expresses 
depends on its place in a story that it also helps to tell. Scene expression may advance a 
narrative purpose or depend upon a narrative framework" (Lopes, 2005:55).49
Can this survive application to other paintings? For instance, does Nighthawks look 
melancholy because (a) it has got a sad lonely looking man drinking alone and two 
49 Lopes also clarifies that "It makes little sense to say that the scene expresses Spiegelman's emotion, though many
emotions are likely to have come into play in his conception of the panel. Rather, the scene serves a narrative end-in 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(Knausgaard and Burkey, 2019:1) 
Knausgaard acknowledges how weird it is to ascribe sorrow to colours or longing to the 
brushstrokes while at the same time suggesting that this is where he thinks the sorrow 
and longing is coming from. Green's proposal is supposed to demystify the experience 
Knausgaard describes, by explaining in some detail how it is that "knowledge of how 
something feels is facilitated by affinities between sensations on the one hand, and 
emotions and moods on the other"(Green, 2007:172). 
Green's own examples are unhelpful in respect of precisely delineating what work he 
thinks 'affinities' are doing. He splits pictures into representational and non­
representational kinds. The first kind will include expression looks as well as 
expression-feels. The second will only have expression-feels. It would have been helpful 
if he had discussed non-representational examples to clarify how the mapping between 
colours, other sensations and affect is supposed to work. But he doesn't. Instead he 
analyses a photograph from Rodchenko, called Pioneer Girl.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that the subject matter of the picture maps to. Furthermore, he seems quite happy to be 
taking himself out of dealing with the whole business of expression (Carroll, 2001:207). 
But it is worth noting why his account of visual metaphor will not extend to deal with 
expressive cases, especially since Aldrich, who Carroll bases his model on, claims 
otherwise (Aldrich, 1968). 
Just because there are issues with Carroll's model, we do not have to conclude that 
metaphor cannot explain expression. In the next section, we will examine an account 
from Christopher Peacocke (2009) who thinks metaphor can explain it. 
4.2 Expressiveness as Perceptual Metaphor 
Figure 19 Howard Hodgkin, Mr and Mrs E.f.P.,1969-73 
Howard Hodgkin's portrait paintings are memorials for friends and acquaintances. The 

























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 22 Akunyili Crosby, Ike ya, 2016 
Peacocke contributes to our theorising about the kind of process that the viewer 
undertakes, which may be opaque to introspection. But the view does not explain the 
precise aspect of the account we wanted to know about. That is, we need to know why 
visible objects should stand in a metaphorical relation to non-visible objects when we 
are looking at paintings. In addition, the account neglects how the perspective from 
which an expression issues is factored into the experience. 
4.3 Metaphorising 
In Chapter Six of Painting as and Art, Wollheim introduces a highly idiosyncratic 
account of pictorial metaphor (Wollheim, 1987). According to Wollheim, the painting as 
a whole is a metaphor, in which 'painting is body' (Wollheim, 1993c). Two of his
examples, Titian's Flaying of Marsyas and De Kooning's Woman I, are used to show how












































































































































































































































































































































Davies	(1994)	 Impersonalist	 Without	 Experienced	resemblance	 Music	
Lopes	(2005)	 Impersonalist	 Without	 Indication	 Pictures	



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































proto empathy, is implicated in our appreciation of visual artworks (Currie, 2011a). 
Primitive or proto empathy is supposed to convey range of sensory and affective 
information through simulative processes, such as for instance, the smoothness of a 
sculpture or the painfulness of pierced flesh and explains why our flinching response is 
triggered when apprehending for instance, Muhammad Ali (figure 28). 
However, Robinson is making a claim about a self-conscious identification with the 
persona's first-person experience of the pictorial scenario. Hence, her condition 
requires more than the simulation of sub-personal processes in order to be satisfied. 
Figure 28 Carl Fischer, Muhammad Ali, 1968 
In this way, Robinson holds that empathetic emotions have epistemic value in regard to 












































































































be imagining the wrong target (himself rather than the pictorial persona). In addition, a 
characteristic of self-conscious emotions is that they involve intellectual feelings rather 
than physiological arousal (Goldie, 2009). 
This means that unless we jettison Robinson's notion of what an empathetic emotion is 
( essentially a physiological arousal) it will not be possible to feel what the persona who 
express self-conscious emotions feels. This leaves our experience of the nostalgia in 
Melanie and Me Swimming, the envy in Mr and Mrs EJP, the narcissism in Albert Diirer's 
Self Portrait, and shame in Jenny Saville's Propped unaccounted for under Robinson's 
model. 
Figure 29 Michael Andrews, Melanie and Me Swimming, 1978-9 
But Robinson has rejected this kind of modification to her view (Robinson, 2005:22, 




























































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 33 Missy Dunaway, Sketchbook, lnstagram 
Non-actual perspectives can therefore vary along both spatial and temporal 
dimensions.122 I may recall the embarrassing piano recital when about to drop off to 
sleep, or think about the new lighting for the den while sat at my desk, or imagine how 
lovely it will be to have the flowers as company on my desk while out on the High Street. 
Like actual perspectives, they are constituted partly by what they are on as well as 
where and when they point. Suppose the delicate flowers are sitting on my desk right 
now and I am looking at them. I can exchange my actual perspective on the flowers for a 
non-actual perspective on them by simply closing my eyes and imagining the flowers in 
the position that they actually are. So, theoretically my represented and actual 
perspectives can be coincident. However, this would be a highly unusual case. 
Ordinarily, when representing a perspective on x it is not one that that is actually 
occupied on x, when representing it. 
122 By varying along temporal dimensions, I mean that we can imagine things with the following kind of content: It is
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Represented		 Ridiculous	 Melancholy	 Demented	 Indignant	
Actual	 Embarrassed	 Melancholy	 Blank	Indifference	 Compassionate	




























































































































































Figure 45 Chuck Close, Big Self-Portrait with Cigarette, 1967-1968
Close has described how he created this painting by blowing up a photograph and 
transposing the photographic marks to canvas with a brush. He says, "I decided to work 
from a photograph so I could accept some things as a given, so I wouldn't have to think 
about compositing or the invention of shape".156 The transposition was not entirely 
faithful. He hesitated and so there are pauses between marks. He introduced 
pentimento by scraping back areas he wanted to 'correct' with razor blades. His starting 
point, a monocular snapshot, is transformed into something more than a record of its 
making. It introduces a (represented) persona perspective. 
On one level, the painting expresses an insouciant arrogance. Ripe with teenage 
ambivalence, it seems to at once scream 'Get me!' and also 'I couldn't care less if you do'. 
We are prescribed to represent a perspective located somewhere beneath his enormous 
156 https://walkerart.org/magazine/chuck-close-discusses-big-self-portrait-1967. Last accessed 28th October 2019.
229 
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head,	forcing	us	to	look	up,	admiringly	at	him.	He	looks	down	on	us,	squint-eyed	from	
the	smoke,	slightly	combatively.	A	look	that	is	accessed	by	attributing	a	third	person	
perspective	to	the	depicted	part	of	the	(whole)	emotion	seen	on	the	face.	The	overall	
ambivalence	between	perspectives	is	not	resolved	at	the	represented	persona	level.	
There	is	something	slightly	off	about	this	posturing.	Close	is	not	yet	the	famous	man	he	
will	become,	yet	his	modesty	seems	too	raw	for	him	to	want	to	reveal	here.	A	tension	
arises	from	this,	a	compelling	confusion	between	arrogance	and	humility	and	it	makes	it	
difficult	to	work	out	what	and	where	the	represented	emotional	perspective	is.	In	
addition,	there	is	something	discombobulating	about	this	experience	for	the	viewer,	
which	is	accentuated	by	the	sheer	immensity	of	the	work.	A	kind	of	confusion	in	regard	
to	the	self-referring	perspectival	relations.		
	
An	explanation	of	this	phenomenological	confusion	can	be	drawn	from	David	Lewis’	
discussion	of	a	two-god	universe.	In	Lewis’	example,	we	must	suppose	that	two	
omniscient	perspectives	co-locate	in	a	single	possible	world	and	that	they	know	exactly	
which	world	it	is.	Therefore,	they	know	every	proposition	that	is	true	at	their	world	
(insofar	as	knowledge	is	a	propositional	attitude,	this	makes	them	omniscient).	But	the	
inevitable	integration	or	nesting	of	these	two	all-powerful	perspectives	unexpectedly	
leads	to	a	loss.	As	Lewis	puts	it,	
I	can	imagine	them	to	suffer	ignorance:	neither	one	knows	which	of	the	
two	he	is.	
(Lewis,	1979)	p.520	
	
In	a	similar	way,	the	persona	and	the	actual	perspectives	may	be	interacting	without	
any	experientially	apparent	hierarchy.	In	which	case,	the	viewer	may	‘see’	all	that	the	
persona	‘sees’	yet	be	ignorant	in	respect	of	which	of	the	two	perspectives	is	the	
mediating	and	which	is	the	actual.	This	suggests	that	although	my	experience	of	the	
Close	painting	is	idiosyncratic,	because	it	relies	on	my	actual	emotional	engagement,	it	is	
aesthetically	relevant.	In	this	case,	what	seems	to	happen	is	that	the	represented	
perspective	at	once	constrains	and	is	in	turned	constrained	by	the	actual	perspective	 	
in	some	non-hierarchical	fashion.	This	leads	to	a	loss	(of	certainty	in	regard	to	the	
boundaries	between	roles)	which	leads	to	an	interpretive	gain	(a	feeling	of	uncertainty,	
arrogance	and	humility).	
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There	are	two	final	comments.	First,	if	I	am	right	about	actual	feeling	being	aesthetically	
relevant	(although	I	do	not	argue	it	is	necessary	or	sufficient)	for	adequate	
apprehension,	then	this	leaves	the	alternative	view	proposed	in	this	chapter	no	worse	
off	than	its	rival	namely,	empathising.	Second,	the	alternative	view	is	in	a	better	position	
than	competitor	accounts	to	explain	how	actual	feeling	can	enhance	or	unlock	
additional	levels	of	expressive	understanding.	For	it	is	the	indeterminacies	that	
emotional	imagining	generates	that	leads	to	a	holistic	interpretative	gain	on	
empathising	and	dry-eyed	attention.	The	gain	can	be	attributed	to	the	way	the	
expression	now	‘belongs’	or	‘co-locates’	partly	in	the	represented	perspective	and	partly	
in	the	actual	perspective	from	which	the	picture	gets	experientially	recounted.		
	
Conclusion		
	
I	have	argued	that	according	to	the	new	persona	theory,	the	represented	persona	is	
misty-eyed.	But	this	does	not	entail	that	the	viewer	must	be	misty-eyed	too.	This	means	
that	the	new	persona	theory	can	accommodate	dry-eyed	apprehension	(albeit	ones	
where	what	is	represented	as	occupying	the	perspective	is	a	misty	persona).	Yet	it	has	
the	additional	resources	to	explain	how	actual	misty-eyed	perspectives	can	be	
aesthetically	relevant	by	deepening	and	extending	expression.	In	this	sense,	the	new	
persona	theory	exposes	how	the	argument	for	either	dry-eye	cognitivism	or	misty-
arousal	presents	participants	in	the	debate	with	a	false	choice.		
	
I	drew	an	analogy	with	emotionally	recollecting	taken	to	be	a	way	of	thinking	over	the	
past	with	emotion.	The	crucial	thought	was	that	in	emotionally	inter-acting	with	a	non-
actual	event,	we	can	discover	and	articulate	expressions	of	emotion	that	belong	to	that	
non-actual	event,	but	which	we	may	have	been	unaware	of	at	the	time	of	the	event.	In	
this	way,	I	will	end	this	thesis	by	thinking	back	to	Daumier’s	Fatherly	Discipline.	This	
was	used	to	introduce	the	intuitive	but	false	model	(E1),	to	explore	the	category	of	
figure	expression	(Chapter	Three)	and	the	idea	of	pictorial	perspective	(Chapter	Four	
p.139).	I	want	to	compare	an	experience	of	Fatherly	Discipline	to	a	paradigm	emotion	
case.	Here	is	the	paradigm	case.	I	blast	my	daughter,	blaming	her	for	the	mess	in	the	
kitchen.	Now	contrite,	I	recall	that	earlier	behaviour,	and	the	blasting	is	intelligible	in	
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the	light	of	the	irritation	she	caused.	But	I	now	concede,	my	reaction	was	slightly	over	
the	top.	The	contriteness	is	partly	what	identifies	my	earlier	excessiveness	but	more	
significantly,	it	alters	the	way	the	past	feels.	What	arises	is	a	peculiar	emotional	
resonance	 	a	dissonant	vibration	of	explosive	anger	that	has	been	ineluctably	infected	
with	shame.	Using	that	paradigm	case	to	guide	us,	it	can	now	be	shown	how	this	
layering	of	perspectives	is	manifest	in	some	expressive	pictures.	In	the	Daumier	picture,	
the	father	blasts	his	rampant	toddler,	blaming	him	for	driving	his	mother	to	distraction	
for	lack	of	sleep.	I	can	represent	the	figure’s	perspective	(explosive)	and	the	persona’s	
perspective	(amusement).	Finally,	I	am	moved	by	this	scene	(wry	sympathy).	And	this	is	
partly	what	identifies	the	exploding	father	as	harmless	rather	than	threatening.	This	
alters	the	way	the	picture	feels.	What	arises	is	a	peculiar	emotional	resonance	 	a	
dissonant	vibration	of	explosive	anger	that	has	been	ineluctably	infected	with	
benevolent	humour.	
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Figure	46	Johannes	Vermeer,	A	Lady	Writing	a	Letter,	c.1665	
[…]Don't	worry,	the	thief	says,	we're	both	on	the	same	side.	He	finds	the	
Dutch	Masters	and	goes	right	for	a	Vermeer:	"Girl	Writing	a	Letter."	The	
thief	knows	what	he's	doing.	He	has	a	Ph.D.	He	slices	the	canvas	on	one	
edge	from	the	shelf	holding	the	salad	bowls	right	down	to	the	square	of	
sunlight	on	the	black	and	white	checked	floor.	The	girl	doesn't	hear	this,	
she's	too	absorbed	in	writing	her	letter,	she	doesn't	notice	him	until	too	
late.	He's	in	the	picture.	He's	already	seated	at	the	harpsichord.	He's	
playing	the	G	Minor	Sonata	by	Domenico	Scarlatti,	which	once	made	her	
heart	beat	till	it	passed	the	harpsichord…	
	
William	Carpenter,	Girl	Writing		a	Love	Letter,	1993	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	
	 234	
Conclusion	
	
In	this	thesis,	I	have	attempted	to	outline	a	new	framework	in	which	to	explore	the	
phenomenon	of	pictorial	expression	and	to	describe	this	in	a	way	that	seems	both	
familiar	and	new.	Familiar,	in	the	sense	of	capturing	an	experience	that	resonates	fairly	
easily	with	those	that	enjoy	experiencing	expressing	paintings,	and	new	in	the	sense	
that	it	makes	a	contribution	to	the	philosophy	literature.	Two	issues	were	examined	in	
detail	in	the	thesis.	The	first	issue	involved	the	epistemic	role	played	by	perspectives	in	
directly	and	mediately	seeing	emotions	in	faces	and	pictures	respectively.	It	was	shown	
that	whenever	we	see	pictorial	content,	what	we	see	is	mediated	by	a	represented	
pictorial	perspective.	The	second	issue	involved	the	property	that	the	perspective	is	on.	
It	was	shown	that	when	a	represented	perspective	involves	a	mind-dependent	
property,	such	as	an	affect	(and	itch	or	an	emotion),	the	viewer	had	to	represent	an	
occupant	of	the	perspective.	An	occupant	that	was	the	kind	of	thing	that	could	
instantiate	the	emotional	perspective.	This	secured	the	second	claim,	that	adequately	
seeing	expressive	content	in	paintings	mandates	imagining	a	persona	occupying	the	
imagined	perspective.	 
The	represented	persona	was	characterised	as	a	notional	subject	who	was	potentially	
completely	indeterminate	(although	it	may	be	made	more	determinate	by	cues	in	or	
relating	to	the	work).	The	distinction	between	the	actual-self	(the	viewer)	and	the	
persona-self,	who	is	a	pretend	self	the	viewer	imagines	being	was	clarified.	With	the	
perspectival	roles	articulated,	the	theory	could	be	applied	productively	to	advance	the	
perennial	debate	over	dry	and	misty-eyed	criticism.	In	this	way,	the	potential	for	the	
new	persona	view	to	contribute	to	our	understanding	of	other	puzzles	appears	strong.		
To	close,	I	will	sketch	out	some	further	lines	of	enquiry	which	this	project	has	raised.	A	
first	concerns	the	relation	between	perspective	and	narrative.	In	our	everyday	
discourse	we	make	frequent	reference	to	pictorial	narrative.	We	share	the	intuition	that	
cave	paintings	depicting	hunting	scenes	are	the	earliest	forms	of	storytelling,	that	
quattrocento	paintings	magniloquently	encapsulate	tales	of	good	and	evil	and	that	
Hogarth’s	multipart	works	are	blunt	painterly	essays	in	humour,	politics	and	
social	empathy.	Yet,	a	more	precise	question	about	the	role	of	narrators	in	these	
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putative	pictorial	narratives	remains	relatively	underexplored.	I	have	argued	that	
perspective	is	a	more	fundamental	mechanism	than	narrative.	But	with	this	foundation	
stone	in	place	the	pathway	opens	up	to	consider	the	variety	of	ways	narrators	may	be	
part	of	picture	meaning.	These	investigations	can	also	shed	light	on	three	further	
perennial	debates	about	our	engagement	with	pictorial	fictions.	The	possibility	of	so-
called	fictional	emotions,	the	puzzle	of	disparate	response	(why	do	we	applaud	Judith	
beheading	someone)	and	why	we	may	resist	imagining	in	the	prescribed	way.	
A	second,	and	related	enquiry	would	be	to	investigate	the	temporal	aspects	of	static	
paintings.	I	have	given	some	indication	of	how	the	experience	of	painting	can	be	
mediately	filtered	through	a	frenzied	perspective	(Bosch)	or	a	slow,	meditative	gaze	
(Bonnard).	A	potential	line	of	exploration	involves	examining	the	relationship	between	
facture,	brushstroke	and	temporal	perspectives	to	build	up	complex	and	compelling	
time-indexed	content	in	a	still	medium.	
A	third	project	would	be	to	investigate	how	far	this	persona	theory	of	pictorial	
expression	generalised	to	other	artistic	mediums?	For	instance,	could	we	make	sense	of	
the	idea	that	musical	meaning	is	similarly	embedded	in	perspectival	structures	
(whether	or	not	we	consider	these	to	be	spatially	governed	as	they	are	in	the	visual	
case).	Does	an	adequate	appreciation	(by	listening)	to	the	expression	of	the	work	
involve	representing	an	emotional	(first-personal)	perspective	on	the	sounds?	Further,	
we	might	investigate	similarities	and	differences	holding	between	specific	kinds	of	
visual	and	music	works	(say,	vocal	works	and	figurative	pictures,	and,	instrumental	
works	and	abstracts).	
Finally,	throughout	the	chapters,	the	term	‘adequate	apprehension’	has	been	used.	An	
additional	question	concerns	the	relation	between	adequately	apprehending	and	
standards	of	correctness.	It	would	be	interesting	to	explore	whether	we	can	arrive	at	a	
unified	notion	of	adequate	apprehension	(what	it	is	like	to	experience	X)	and	
correctness	(what	X	is	expressed)	in	the	light	of	Kant’s	remarks	about	imputed	
judgements. 
Overall,	I	hope	to	have	shown	that	a	persona	theory	can	be	both	substantive	and	
productive,	progressing	the	investigation	into	the	expression	of	emotion	in	the	arts.	 
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Girl	Writing	a	Letter	
William	Carpenter,	1993 
	
A	thief	drives	to	the	museum	in	his	black	van.	The	night	watchman	says	Sorry,	closed,	
you	have	to	come	back	tomorrow.	The	thief	sticks	the	point	of	his	knife	in	the	guard's	
ear.	I	haven't	got	all	evening,	he	says,	I	need	some	art.	Art	is	for	pleasure,	the	guard	says,	
not	possession,	you	can't	something,	and	then	the	duct	tape	is	going	across	his	mouth.	
Don't	worry,	the	thief	says,	we're	both	on	the	same	side.	He	finds	the	Dutch	Masters	and	
goes	right	for	a	Vermeer:	"Girl	Writing	a	Letter."	The	thief	knows	what	he's	doing.	He	
has	a	Ph.D.	He	slices	the	canvas	on	one	edge	from	the	shelf	holding	the	salad	bowls	right	
down	to	the	square	of	sunlight	on	the	black	and	white	checked	floor.	The	girl	doesn't	
hear	this,	she's	too	absorbed	in	writing	her	letter,	she	doesn't	notice	him	until	too	late.	
He's	in	the	picture.	He's	already	seated	at	the	harpsichord.	He's	playing	the	G	Minor	
Sonata	by	Domenico	Scarlatti,	which	once	made	her	heart	beat	till	it	passed	the	
harpsichord	and	raced	ahead	and	waited	for	the	music	to	catch	up.	She's	worked	on	this	
letter	for	three	hundred	and	twenty	years.	Now	a	man's	here,	and	though	he's	dressed	
in	some	weird	clothes,	he's	playing	the	harpsichord	for	her,	for	her	alone,	there's	no	one	
else	alive	in	the	museum.	The	man	she	was	writing	to	is	dead?	time	to	stop	thinking	
about	him?	the	artist	who	painted	her	is	dead.	She	should	be	dead	herself,	only	she	has	
an	ear	for	music	and	a	heart	that's	running	up	the	staircase	of	the	Gardner	Museum	with	
a	man	she's	only	known	for	a	few	minutes,	but	it's	true,	it	feels	like	her	whole	life.	So	
when	the	thief	hands	her	the	knife	and	says	you	slice	the	paintings	out	of	their	frames,	
you	roll	them	up,	she	does	it;	when	he	says	you	put	another	strip	of	duct	tape	over	the	
guard's	mouth	so	he'll	stop	talking	about	aesthetics,	she	tapes	him,	and	when	the	thief	
puts	her	behind	the	wheel	and	says,	drive,	baby,	the	night	is	ours,	it	is	the	Girl	Writing	a	
Letter	who	steers	the	black	van	on	to	the	westbound	ramp	for	Storrow	and	then	to	the	
Mass	Pike,	it's	the	Girl	Writing	a	Letter	who	drives	eighty	miles	an	hour	headed	west	
into	a	country	that's	not	even	discovered	yet,	with	a	known	criminal,	a	van	full	of	old	
masters	and	nowhere	to	go	but	down,	but	for	the	Girl	Writing	a	Letter	these	things	don't	
matter,	she's	got	a	beer	in	her	free	hand,	she's	on	the	road,	she's	real	and	she's	in	love.		
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